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ABSTRACT
At a time when information seekers first turn to digital
sources for news and opinion, it is critical that we under-
stand the role that social media plays in human behavior.
This is especially true when information consumers also act
as information producers and editors by their online activ-
ity. In order to better understand the effects that editorial
ratings have on online human behavior, we report the results
of a large-scale in-vivo experiment in social media. We find
that small, random rating manipulations on social media
submissions created significant changes in downstream rat-
ings resulting in significantly different final outcomes. Posi-
tive treatment resulted in a positive effect that increased the
final rating by 11.02% on average. Compared to the control
group, positive treatment also increased the probability of
reaching a high rating (≥2000) by 24.6%. Contrary to the
results of related work we also find that negative treatment
resulted in a negative effect that decreased the final rating
by 5.15% on average.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.1.2 [Models and Principles]: User/Machine Systems—
Human information processing ; H.5.3 [Information Inter-
faces and Presentation]: Group and Organization Inter-
faces—Web-based interaction
General Terms
Human Factors, Experimentation
Keywords
social media, voting, herding effects
1. INTRODUCTION
What is becoming known as collective intelligence bares
the potential to enhance human potential and accomplish
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what is impossible individually. Indeed, the collective judge-
ments of social groups have been shown to be remarkably ac-
curate when their averaged judgements are compared with
the judgements of an individual. For example, more than a
century ago the experiments of Francis Galton determined
that the median estimate of a group can be more accurate
than estimates of experts[3]. Surowiecki’s book The Wis-
dom of the Crowds finds similar examples in stock markets,
political elections, quiz shows and a variety of other fields
where large groups of people behave intelligently and per-
form better than an elite few[14]. However, other exper-
iments have shown that when individuals’ perceptions of
quality and value follow the behavior of a group, the re-
sulting herd mentality can be suboptimal for both the
individual and the group [6, 8].
In modern, digital society, people frequently rely on the
anonymous, aggregate ratings of others to make important
decisions. The sheer volume of new information being pro-
duced and consumed only increases the reliance that individ-
uals place on anonymous others to curate and sort massive
amounts of information. But by relying on the judgements
of others, we may be susceptible to malicious ratings with
some ulterior motive.
With this vulnerability in mind, recent studies have at-
tempted to determine if and how past ratings affect fu-
ture ratings and the general opinion of the public. Unfor-
tunately, causal determinations are difficult to assess. In
a closely related experiment, Wu and Huberman measured
rating behavior in two different online platforms. The first
allowed users to see prior ratings before they voted and
the other platform hid the prior ratings until after the user
voted. They found that when no information about previ-
ous ratings or page views are available, the ratings and user-
opinions expressed tend to follow regular patterns. However,
in cases where the previous ratings were made known, the
user-opinions tended to be either neutral or form a polarized
consensus. In the latter case, new opinions tend to reinforce
previous opinions and thus become more extreme [17].
In a separate line of work, Sorenson used mistaken omis-
sions of books from the NY Times bestsellers list to identify
the boost in sales that accompany the perceived popular-
ity of a book’s appearance on the list[13]. Similarly, when
the download counters for different software labels were ran-
domly increased, Hanson and Putler found that users are
significantly more likely to download software that had the
largest counter increase[5]. Salganik and Watts performed a
study to determine the extent to which perception of quality
becomes a“self-fulfilling prophecy.” In their experiment they
inverted the true popularity of songs in an online music mar-
ketplace, and found that the perceived-but-false-popularity
became real over time[12].
The recent popularity of social networks has led to the
study of socio-digital influence and popularity cascades where
models can be developed based on the adoption rate of
friends (e.g., share, retweet). Bakshy et al., find that the
friendship plays a significant role in the sharing of content[2].
Similarly, Leskovec et al. were able to formulate a genera-
tive model that predicts the size and shape of information
cascades in online social networks [7].
Like social networks, online social news platforms allow
individuals to contribute to the wisdom of the crowd in new
ways. These platforms are typically Web sites that contain
very simple mechanics. In general, there are 4 operations
that are shared among social news sites:
1. individuals generate content or submit links to content,
2. submissions are rated and ranked according to their
rating scores,
3. individuals can comment on the submitted content,
4. comments are rated and ranked according to their rat-
ing scores.
Simply put, social news platforms allow individuals to
submit content and vote on the content they like or dislike.
The voting mechanism found in socio-digital platforms
provides a type of Web-democracy that is open to all comers.
Given the widespread use and perceived value of these vot-
ing systems[4], it is important to consider whether they can
successfully harness the wisdom of the crowd to accurately
aggregate individual information.
In our study, we determine what effect, if any, post rank-
ing and vote score has on rating behavior. This is accom-
plished via an in vivo experiment on the social media Web
site, Reddit, by inserting random votes into the live rating
system.
Reddit is a social news Web site where registered users
can submit content, such as direct posts or links. Regis-
tered users can then up-vote submissions or down-vote sub-
missions to organize the posts and determine the post’s po-
sition on the site; posts with a high vote score (i.e., up-votes
– down-votes) are ranked more highly than posts with a low
vote score. Reddit is organized into many thousands of “sub-
reddits,”according to topic or area of interest, e.g., news, sci-
ence, compsci, datamining, and theoryofreddit. Posts must
be submitted to a subreddit. A user that subscribes to a
particular subreddit will see highly ranked posts from that
subreddit on their frontpage, which Reddit describes as ‘the
front page of the Internet.’
It is important to note that, unlike other online social
spaces, Reddit is not a social network. the notion of friend-
ship and friend-links, like on Facebook, is mostly absent on
Reddit. Although usernames are associated with posts and
comments, the true identity of registered users is generally
unknown and in many cases fiercely guarded.
In fact, we attempted to find friendship by looking at user-
pairs that frequently reply to each other in comments; un-
fortunately, more than 99.9% of the comments were in reply
to a user that they had never previously replied to. Thus,
we typically refer to Reddit a social non-network, and the
vast amount of previous social network literature does not
apply.
Although this is the first in-vivo Reddit experiment, our
work is motivated and informed by multiple overlapping
streams of literature and build on substantial prior work
from multiple fields such as: herding behavior from theoret-
ical and empirical viewpoints [11, 16]; social influence [2];
collective intelligence [6, 1]; and online rating systems [9].
A recent study by Muchnik et al on a small social news
Web site, similar to Reddit, found that a single up-vote/like
on an online comment significantly increased the final vote
count of the treated comment; interestingly, the same ex-
periment also found that a single negative rating had little
effect on the final vote count[10].
We report the results of a large (N = 93, 019) in-vivo
experiment on Reddit that up-voted or down-voted posts at
random. Based on these experimental treatments we observe
the effects that votes have on the final score of a post as a
proxy for observing herding effects in social news. Unlike the
experimental study performed by Muchnik et al., and other
behavioral studies our experiment: 1) manipulates votes of
posts rather than comments, 2) leverages Reddit’s dynamic,
score-based ranking system rather than a time-only rank-
ing system, 3) does not involve friendship or the use of so-
cial networks, and 4) randomly delays the vote treatment
rather than always performing the treatment immediately
upon creation.
2. METHODS
During the 6 months between September 1, 2013 and Jan-
uary 31, 2014 a computer program was executed every 2
minutes that collected post data from Reddit through an
automated two-step process. First, the most recent post on
Reddit was identified and assigned to one of three treat-
ment groups: up-treated, down-treated, or control. Up-
treated posts were artificially given an up-vote (a +1 rating)
and down-treated posts were given a down-vote (a -1 rat-
ing). Up-treatment, down-treatment and the control have
an equal likelihood of being selected. Vote treated posts are
assigned a random delay ranging from no delay up to an
hour delay in intervals of 0, .5, 1, 5, 10, 30 and 60 minutes.
Second, each post was re-sampled 4 days later and final vote
totals were recorded.
These treatments created a small, random manipulation
signalling positive or negative judgement that is perceived
by other voters as having the same expected quality as all
other votes thereby enabling estimates of the effects of a
single vote while holding all other factors constant. This
data collection resulted in 93,019 sampled posts, of which
30,998 were up-treated and 30,796 were down-treated; each
treatment type was randomly assigned a delay interval with
equal likelihood. Treatments were removed from the vote
scores before data analysis was performed, i.e., up-treated
post-scores were decremented by 1 and down-treated post-
scores were incremented by 1.
During the experimental time period, Reddit reported
that their up-vote and down-vote totals were “fuzzed” as an
anti-spam measure; fortunately, they certified that a post’s
score (i.e., up-votes minus down-votes) was always accurate.
In July of 2014, after the data gathering phase of this ex-
periment had ended, Reddit removed the vote totals from
their Web site and replaced it with a semi-accurate points
system.
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Figure 1: Final scores for artificially, randomly up-treated
posts, down-treated posts, and scores for untreated posts
in the control group are shown. Red inner error bars show
the standard error of the mean; black outer error bars show
the 95% confidence interval. Fig. (a) shows the scores in
the heavily skewed full distribution. When the highest 1%
of scores are removed as in Fig. (b), the score distribution
becomes much less skewed resulting in tighter error bounds,
which further result in significant increases for up-treated
posts and significant decreases for down-treated posts when
compared to the control group.
3. RESULTS
We first compared the final vote totals of posts in each
treatment group. These findings measure the overall effect
that up-treatments and down-treatments have on the overall
life of a post.
Figure 1(a) shows the distribution of the final post scores
for each treatment group. Black outer error bars show the
95% confidence interval and red inner error bars show the
standard error of the mean. The distribution of scores is
extremely positively skewed with a skewness of 11.2 and a
kurtosis of 149.8. If we remove the top 1% highest scoring
posts from the data set the skewness and kurtosis values
drop to 6.5 and 54.9 respectively giving a better, although
still skewed, view of the treatment effects. Figure 1(B) shows
the distribution of the final post scores with the top 1% of
posts removed. In this case, the up-treated posts have a
significantly higher final score, and the down-treated posts
have a significantly lower final score.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests showed that the final
score distribution of all up-treated posts were more pos-
itively skewed than posts in the control group (K-S test
statistic: 0.08; p < 2.2 × 10−16), which were more posi-
tively skewed than down-treated posts (K-S test statistic:
0.11; p < 2.2 × 10−16). Student’s T-Test on log-scores also
showed that the up-treated posts were significantly higher
than the control group (p = 1.69 × 10−20), and that the
down down-treated posts were significantly lower than the
control group (p = 1.69 × 10−09) although scores less than
or equal to 0 were removed to calculate the log of the final
scores.
Up vote and down vote treatments were performed after
a 0, 0.5, 1, 5, 10, 30 or 60 minute delay chosen at ran-
dom, and Figure 1 does not distinguish between the effects
of vote-treatments performed after the various delay peri-
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Figure 2: Final scores for artificially, randomly up-treated
posts, down-treated posts, and scores for untreated posts in
the control group separated into their respective treatment
delay intervals. Horizontal lines show the overall mean of
each treatment group. The top 1% of scores were removed
to un-skew the score distribution. These results show that
treatment delay had little effect on the mean final score.
ods. Figure 2 separates the results from Figure 1 into their
respective treatment delay groups. We expected that imme-
diate votes would have a larger effect than votes performed
after a long delay. However, these results show, surpris-
ingly, that a delay in treatment generally had little effect on
the mean outcome. Unfortunately, displayed error bounds
have little meaning when the data is so highly skewed; K-
S tests again showed that all up-treated posts were more
positively skewed than posts in the control group and that
the effects generally diminished as the delay interval in-
creased: (K-S test statistic: 0.087(0 min), 0.087(.5 min),
0.087(1 min), 0.083(5 min), 0.082(10 min), 0.087(30 min),
0.078(60 min); p < 2.2×10−16).-Similarly, the control group
was more positively skewed than the down-treated posts, but
the effects were mixed as the delay interval increased: (K-
S test statistic: 0.119(0 min), 0.110(.5 min), 0.110(1 min),
0.112(5 min), 0.119(10 min), 0.097(30 min), 0.099(60 min);
p < 2.2× 10−16).
Unlike the results presented by Muchnik et al. [10] on
a similar experiment, we find that the positive and nega-
tive treatments show mostly symmetric results, i.e., the up-
treatments and down-treatments result in similar, yet oppo-
site, departures from the control group. The reason for the
differences is unclear and worthy of further investigation.
We are careful to note that reports of mean-averages and
standard error are often misleading on such highly skewed
data. With this in mind, Figure 3 shows the inner-deciles
of the results as a function of their treatment delay. Taken
together these results show graphically what the KS tests
imply: that up-treated posts tend to be skewed more highly
than the control group, and that down-treated posts tend
not to be as highly skewed as the control group. The decile
plots also show that the majority of posts (deciles ≤ 50%)
receive at most a final score of 2. A single up-treatment
actually does not change the median (50% decile) final score,
but a down-treatment does lower the median score from 2
to 1.
−
3
.0
−
2
.0
−
1
.0
0
.0
10%  decile
Wait Time (min)
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
−
1
.0
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
20%  decile
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
−
1
.0
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
30%  decile
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
40%  decile
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
0
.0
1
.0
2
.0
3
.0
50%  decile
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
1
2
3
4
5
60%  decile
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
3
4
5
6
7
8
70%  decile
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
8
1
0
1
2
1
4
1
6
80%  decile
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
3
0
3
5
4
0
90%  decile
0 .5 1 5 10 30 60
Figure 3: The middle 9 deciles of up-treated, down-treated and control group posts are shown according to their interval
times. These results show that most posts receive a median score of 2 or less, and that the treatment has the most effect in
the higher deciles of the score distribution.
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Figure 4: The probability of a post receiving a correspond-
ing score by treatment type. The inset graph shows the
complete probability distribution function. The outer graph
shows the probability of a post receiving scores between 500
and 2000 – an approximation for trending or frontpage posts.
Up-treated posts are 24% more likely to reach 2000 votes
than the control group.
Overall, the results suggest that an up-treatment increases
the probability that a post will result in a high score relative
to the control group, and that down-treatments decrease
that probability relative to the control group. However, on
Reddit and other social news sites only a handful of posts
become extremely popular. On Twitter and Facebook this
is generally referred to as a trending topic, but on Reddit the
most popular posts are the ones that reach the front page.
Unfortunately, reaching the front page is a difficult thing
to discern because each user’s homepage is different, based
on the topical subreddits to which the user has subscribed.
Nevertheless, we crudely define a post as having become
popular, i.e., is trending, on the frontpage, etc., if it has a
score of more than 500. Using this definition Figure 4 shows
the probability of a post reaching a given final score under
the two treatment conditions. This probability distribution
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Figure 5: Mean scores of down-treated, control group and
up-treated posts shown with 95% confidence intervals on the
top 8 most active subreddits.
function is monotonically decreasing, positively skewed, and
shows that up-treatments result in a large departure from
the control group. However, despite our earlier claims of
up-treatment and down-treatment symmetry, these results
show that, in the upper limits of the distribution, down-
treatments do not effect the final score results. These results
mean that, compared to the control group, an up-treated
post is 7.9% more likely to have a final score of at least
1000, and an up-treated post is 24.6% more likely to have a
final score of at least 2000.
We finally investigated treatment effects in the top 10
most frequent subreddits. These do not necessarily corre-
spond to the top 10 most popular subreddits, but are rather
the subreddits to which posts are most frequently submit-
ted. From the top 10, we removed politic and friendsafari
because posts in politic are automatically submitted by a
computer program, and because posts in friendsafari cannot
be down-treated according to the subreddit rules. Results
show significant positive effects in AdviceAnimals, AskRed-
dit and videos, and significant negative effects in AskReddit
and pics. Within the top 500 subreddits, we found that 22%
had significant up-treatment effects, 21.6% had significant
down-treatments, and 5.4% of subreddits had significant dif-
ferences in both the up-treatment and down-treatment re-
sults as compared to the control group. Also in the top
500 there was no correlation between up-treatment signif-
icance and number of submissions the subreddit received
(r2 = 0.014; p-value = 0.007), nor down-treatment signif-
icance and number of submissions the subreddit received
(r2 = 0.010; p-value = 0.026)
4. DISCUSSION
We find that the positive treatment of a single, random
“upvote”on a Reddit post has a corresponding positive herd-
ing effect that increases post scores on average and in the
top limits of the heavily skewed score distribution. We fur-
ther found that the negative treatment of a single, random
“downvote” on a post has a corresponding negative herding
effect that significantly decreased the post scores on aver-
age, in contrast to the asymmetric findings of Muchnik et
al. [10], who found no significant effects of a negative treat-
ment. However, our results begin to resemble asymmetry
in the top limits of the score distribution meaning that a
negative treatment does not decrease the probability that a
post will receive a high score.
When treatments were separated according to their delay
intervals we found that immediate treatments have a slightly
larger positive effect than those with longer delays, but the
negative delay results did not follow a clear trend. The time
of day a vote is placed did not change the overall effect.
The nature of the manner in which social platforms rank
items for viewing typically utilizes the ratings, in this case
the post scores, of the items being ranked. The results of our
experiment show that random vote perturbations through
vote treatments impact the post scores of postings on Red-
dit. These results underscore the need for counter measures
against vote chaining and social engineering strategies as
multiple artificial votes are likely to increase the herding ef-
fect.
Finally, we re-draw attention to what Eric Gilbert calls,
the ‘widespread underprovision of votes’ in social media like
Reddit [4]. Although our data does not draw these figures
explicitly, we estimate that only .25% of the of the daily vis-
itors to Reddit actually vote on the items they view. This
seems to be an even further skewed anecdote of the 1-9-90
rule of social networking [15], and may be the an underesti-
mated reason behind the results presented in this paper.
Similar work on post comment threads has been collected
and will be presented in future reports.
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